October 31, 2005
October 27, 2005
Ingram: So long, Mr. Greenspan
Ingram: So long, Mr. Greenspan
During the U.S. presidential election campaign in 2000, Senator John McCain was asked what he would do if something were to happen to Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan. The Senator replied: "God forbid, I would do like they did in the movie Weekend at Bernie's. I would prop him up and put a pair of dark glasses on him."
In a single sentence, Mr. McCain summed up just how much the U.S. stock market, and as a result much of the American economy, had come to rely on the central banker known in some circles as "The Maestro." The senator's joke also hinted at the very real truth that the Federal Reserve chairman's presence alone — rather than any specific act by the central bank — was enough to soothe investors.
Within months, however, Mr. McCain's comments would be cast in a whole new light. As he spoke, the tech-stock boom was already beginning to lose some of its steam, and stock markets had begun a long free-fall. By the time the bottom arrived, more than $8-trillion (U.S.) in theoretical market value had vanished, and plenty of people were more than happy to blame Mr. Greenspan for helping to destroy it. After all, hadn't he spoken in a much-quoted speech in 1996 about the market's "irrational exuberance?" If only the Fed had taken the appropriate action, the theory went, everything would have turned out fine.
It's hard to imagine anyone less suited to this kind of public attention than Alan Greenspan. A soft-spoken and now fairly elderly man (he turns 80 next year) with large, defiantly unstylish glasses, Mr. Greenspan carries a battered, overstuffed briefcase to his regular meetings on Capitol Hill, and looks a lot like the retired accountant or economics professor he might otherwise have been. In an earlier life, he was a saxophone-playing jazz musician and part of the circle of intellectuals around writer-philosopher Ayn Rand, with whom he reportedly was close.
One of the downsides to being the world's most powerful central banker is that you get blamed for anything bad that happens to either the U.S. economy or the U.S. stock market, and in some cases the economies and markets of other countries too. Mr. Greenspan is no exception. Among other things, he has been blamed for the 1991 recession, the currency crisis of the mid-1990s, the stock-market bubble of the late 1990s, the economic slowdown that followed, and what some see as the current real-estate bubble.
He was even blamed by some for the stock-market collapse of 1987, despite the fact that he was only named to the Fed job two months before. That barb might have hit especially hard, considering that Mr. Greenspan's father was a stockbroker who was ruined by the stock-market crash of 1929.
It's worth noting that Mr. Greenspan's infamous comment about "irrational exuberance" wasn't meant as a description of the U.S. stock market. In fact, the phrase appeared in a question posed by the Fed chairman to his audience at the time, which was made up of other central bankers. The question was "How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values?" But the simple fact that Mr. Greenspan — who became famous for not saying much, and taking a long time to not say it, as someone once said — would even raise that question caused a panic. That reaction said more about irrational exuberance than anything the Fed chairman did.
The uncomfortable conclusion one comes to after reading Mr. Greenspan's comments over the years, at least for those who would prefer to see the U.S. central banker as omniscient, is that he asked that question because it was one he himself was wrestling with, and has continued to wrestle with since. How much attention should a central bank pay to the stock market? The classical view of the Fed is that its job is to control inflation, not to try and micro-manage a specific asset class (that is, stocks).
Although some economists have said that this view needs to change, it is clear that Mr. Greenspan doesn't agree (and neither does his successor Ben Bernanke, who has written a paper on the subject). In a speech to an economics conference in 2002, the Fed chairman effectively responded to his critics by saying: "The notion that a well-timed incremental tightening could have been calibrated to prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion."
Mr. Greenspan said history shows that only a sharp increase in short-term interest rates — one that "engenders a significant economic retrenchment" — would be enough to slow a bubble, and that this in turn would have a substantial negative effect on the U.S. economy. In fact, Mr. Greenspan suggested it was hubris to assume that central bankers could diagnose a bubble at all. "We recognized that, despite our deep suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact — that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence," he said.
In many ways, Mr. Greenspan's critics made the same mistake his many fans have, which is to assign almost superhuman qualities to a man who, while brilliant, is as mortal as anyone. This hero-worship itself contributed to the "moral hazard" or "Greenspan put" that some market watchers have referred to, a mindset that encouraged investors to take larger and larger risks, confident that they would be rescued by The Maestro. Was that Mr. Greenspan's fault? Hardly. But it has become part of his legacy.
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan
At the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.
December 5, 1996
The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society
Good evening ladies and gentlemen. I am especially pleased to accept AEI's Francis Boyer Award for 1996 and be listed with so many of my friends and former associates. In my lecture this evening I want to give some personal perspectives on central banking and, consequently, I shall be speaking only for myself.
William Jennings Bryan reportedly mesmerized the Democratic Convention of 1896 with his memorable ". . . you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold." His utterances underscored the profoundly divisive role of money in his time--a divisiveness that remains apparent today. Bryan was arguing for monetizing silver at an above-market price in order to expand the money supply. The presumed consequences would have been an increase in product prices and an accompanying shift in the value of net claims on future wealth from the "monied interests" of the East to the indebted farmers of the West who would arguably be able to pay off their obligations with cheaper money.
The debates, before and since, over the issue of our money standard have mirrored the deliberations on the manner in which we have chosen to govern ourselves, and, perhaps more fundamentally, debates on the basic values that should govern our society.
For, at root, money--serving as a store of value and medium of exchange--is the lubricant that enables a society to organize itself to achieve economic progress. The ability to store the fruits of one's labor for future consumption is necessary for the accumulation of capital, the spread of technological advances and, as a consequence, rising standards of living.
Clearly in this context, the general price level, that is, the average exchange rate for money against all goods and services, and how it changes over time, plays a profoundly important role in any society, because it influences the nature and scope of our economic and social relationships over time.
It is, thus, no wonder that we at the Federal Reserve, the nation's central bank, and ultimate guardian of the purchasing power of our money, are subject to unending scrutiny. Indeed, it would be folly were it otherwise.
A central bank in a democratic society is a magnet for many of the tensions that such a society confronts. Any institution that can affect the purchasing power of the currency is perceived as potentially affecting the level and distribution of wealth among the participants of that society, hardly an inconsequential issue.
Not surprisingly, the evolution of central banking in this nation has been driven by such concerns. The experiences with paper money during the Revolutionary War were decidedly inauspicious. "Not worth a Continental" was scarcely the epithet one would wish on a medium of exchange. This moved Alexander Hamilton, with some controversy, to press for legislation that established the soundness of the credit of the United States by assuming, and ultimately repaying, the war debts not only of the fledgling federal government, but of the states as well. Equally controversial was the chartering of the First Bank of the United States, which, although it had few functions of a modern central bank, was nonetheless believed to be a significant threat to states rights and the Constitution itself.
Although majority controlled by private interests, the Bank engaged in actions perceived to shift power to the federal government. Such a shift was thought of by many as a fundamental threat to the new democracy, and an essential element of what was feared to be a Hamilton plan to re-establish a powerful aristocracy. The First Bank--and especially its successor Second Bank of the United States--endeavored to restrict state bank credit expansion when it appeared inordinate, by gathering bank notes and tendering them for specie. This reduced the reserve base and the ability of the fledgling American banking system to expand credit. The issue of states' rights and concern about the power of the central government reflected the free wheeling individualism of that time. The Second Bank was a major issue of the election of 1832. Earlier in that year, President Andrew Jackson had vetoed the bill to extend its charter, and the election became a referendum on his veto. The outcome was a resounding victory for Jackson and the death knell for the Bank.
It has not been easy, however, to separate often seemingly conflicting threads in the debate between advocates of state powers over money and those seeking a national role. When Andrew Jackson vetoed the charter renewal of the Second Bank of the United States, for example, he argued for the severing of the grip on the economy of easterners and especially foreigners, who owned a significant stock interest in the bank. Ironically, by helping to create what was perceived to be an unstable currency, he set the stage for the later development of a full-fledged gold standard, the institution that Bryan railed against in 1896 from much the same populist philosophical base as Jackson.
After the Civil War, redemption of the paper greenbacks issued during the war brought an era of a gold-standard-induced deflation, which, while it may not have thwarted the impressive advance of industrialization, was seen by many as suppressing credit availability for the rural interests of the nation, which were still a majority. The general price level declined for more than two decades, which meant borrowers were paying off their loans in more expensive dollars than those they borrowed.
Not surprisingly, mounting pressures developed for reform, with Bryan bearing the standard for subsidized silver coinage, that is, free silver. Though Bryan lost to McKinley in 1896 (and again in 1900), the rural-based pressures for a more elastic currency did not diminish and ultimately were reflected, in part, in the creation of the Federal Reserve.
Nonetheless, many of the proponents of banking reform in the 1890s, and in the aftermath of the Panic of 1907, were suspicious of creating a central bank. In very large measure, those concerns underlay the various threads of reform that were joined together in the design and creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Its founding followed a prolonged debate on the balance of power between the interests of the New York money center banks and the rest of the nation, still largely rural. The compromise that resulted from that debate created twelve regional Reserve Banks with a Washington presence vested with a Federal Reserve Board. Its purpose was to "furnish an elastic currency, . . . to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes." Monetary policy as we know it today, was not among the "other purposes." That evolved largely by accident in the 1920s.
Even with a central bank, the gold standard was still the dominant constraint on the issuance of paper currency and the expansion of bank deposits. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve was to play a minor role in affecting the purchasing power of the currency for many years to come.
The world changed markedly with the advent of the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the evisceration of the gold standard. The upheaval, and still festering fear of New York "monied interests," engendered the Banking Acts of 1933 and more importantly of 1935, which vested more of the Federal Reserve's authority with the Board of Governors in Washington. During World War II, and through 1951, however, monetary policy was effectively subservient to the interests of the Treasury, which sought access to low-cost credit. With the so-called Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord of 1951, the Federal Reserve began to develop its current degree of independence.
Although in the 1950s and early 1960s there were short-lived bouts of inflation that caused momentary concern about sustained increases in the price level, these events did little to shake the conviction of most that America's economic and financial structure would indefinitely and effectively contain any inflationary forces. This prescription certainly seems to have been reflected in the low inflation premium then embedded in long-term bonds.
That this view was profoundly wrong soon became apparent. The 1970s saw inflation and unemployment simultaneously at relatively elevated levels for some time. The notion that this could occur was nowhere to be found in the conventional wisdom of the economic policy philosophy that developed out of the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s and its subsequent empirical applications. Moreover, these models embodied the view that aggregate demand expansion, from almost any level, would permanently create new jobs. When that expansion carried the economy beyond "full employment" there would be a cost in terms of higher inflation--but only a one-time increase in inflation, so that there existed a permanent trade off between sustainable levels of inflation and employment.
The stagflation of the 1970s required a thorough conceptual overhaul of economic thinking and policymaking. Monetarism, and new insights into the effects of anticipatory expectations on economic activity and price setting, competed strongly against the traditional Keynesianism. Gradually the power of state intervention to achieve particular economic outcomes came to be seen as much more limited. A consensus gradually emerged in the late 1970s that inflation destroyed jobs, or at least could not create them.
This view has become particularly evident in the communiques that have emanated from the high-level international gatherings of the past quarter century. That inflation could reduce employment was a highly controversial subject in the mid-1970s when introduced into communique language drafts. At the meetings I attended as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the notion invariably induced extended debates. Today in similar communiques such language is accepted boiler plate and rarely the focus of discussion. This shift in attitudes and understanding provided political support in 1980 and thereafter for the type of monetary policy required to rebalance the economy.
Despite waxing and waning over the decades, a deep-seated tension still exists over government's role as an economic policymaker. This tension is evident in Congressional debates, campaign rhetoric, and our ubiquitous talk shows.
It should not be a surprise that the very same ambiguities and conflicts that characterize the rest of our political life have their reflection in the nation's current view of its central bank, the Federal Reserve. With regard to monetary policy, the view--or at least the suspicion--still persists in some quarters that an activist, expansionary policy could yield dividends in terms of permanently higher output and employment.
Nonetheless, there is a grudging acceptance of the degree of independence afforded our institution, and an awareness that unless we are free of the appropriations process that our independence could be compromised. It is generally recognized and appreciated that if the Federal Reserve's monetary policy decisions were subject to Congressional or Presidential override, short-term political forces would soon dominate. The clear political preference for lower interest rates would unleash inflationary forces, inflicting severe damage on our economy.
Notwithstanding, the central bank has not been immune from the suspicion and lack of respect that has come to afflict virtually all institutions in our society since the traumas of Vietnam, Watergate, and the destabilizing inflation in the 1970s.
The Federal Reserve's most important mission, of course, is monetary policy. I wish I could say that there is a bound volume of immutable instructions on my desk on how effectively to implement policy to achieve our goals of maximum employment, sustainable economic growth, and price stability. Instead, we have to deal with a dynamic, continuously evolving economy whose structure appears to change from business cycle to business cycle, an issue I shall return to shortly.
Because monetary policy works with a lag, we need to be forward looking, taking actions to forestall imbalances that may not be visible for many months. There is no alternative to basing actions on forecasts, at least implicitly. It means that often we need to tighten or ease before the need for action is evident to the public at large, and that policy may have to reverse course from time to time as the underlying forces acting on the economy shift. This process is not easy to get right at all times, and it is often difficult to convey to the American people, whose support is essential to our mission.
Because the Fed is perceived as being capable of significantly affecting the lives of all Americans, that we should be subject to constant scrutiny should not come as any surprise. Indeed, speaking as a citizen, and not Fed Chairman, I would be concerned were it otherwise. Our monetary policy independence is conditional on pursuing policies that are broadly acceptable to the American people and their representatives in the Congress.
Augmenting concerns about the Federal Reserve is the perception that we are a secretive organization, operating behind closed doors, not always in the interests of the nation as a whole. This is regrettable, and we continuously strive to alter this misperception.
If we are to maintain the confidence of the American people, it is vitally important that, excepting the certain areas where the premature release of information could frustrate our legislated mission, the Fed must be as transparent as any agency of government. It cannot be acceptable in a democratic society that a group of unelected individuals are vested with important responsibilities, without being open to full public scrutiny and accountability.
To be sure, if we are to carry out effectively the monetary policy mission the Congress has delegated to us, there are certain Federal Reserve deliberations that have to remain confidential for a period of time. To open up our debates on monetary policy fully to immediate disclosure would unsettle financial markets and constrain our discussions in a manner that would undercut our ability to function. Nonetheless, we continue to look for ways to expand the flow of information to the public without compromising our deliberations and purposes. We have recently commenced to announce all policy actions immediately (federal funds rate changes as well as discount rate changes) and have expanded the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee.
For many years, the Federal Reserve has maintained what we trust is a highly sophisticated day-by-day, near real-time, evaluation of the American economy and, where relevant, of foreign economies as well. We are able, partly through our twelve Reserve Banks, to monitor continuously developments in the real world. The information supplied about local conditions by the directors of the Reserve Banks has been frequently useful in identifying emerging national trends and in evaluating their underlying regional implications.
The issues with which we are confronted differ in urgency over time. Inflation concerns were not a dominant factor in economic forecasting in the 1950s and early 1960s, for example. Since the late 1970s, however, such concerns have become an important element in policymaking. More recently inflation has been low, but its future course remains uncertain. The development of comfortable product, but tight labor, markets has been a crucial factor in short-term economic forecasts of recent months--a phenomenon for which there is scant historic precedent.
There is, regrettably, no simple model of the American economy that can effectively explain the levels of output, employment, and inflation. In principle, there may be some unbelievably complex set of equations that does that. But we have not been able to find them, and do not believe anyone else has either.
Consequently, we are led, of necessity, to employ ad hoc partial models and intensive informative analysis to aid in evaluating economic developments and implementing policy. There is no alternative to this, though we continuously seek to enhance our knowledge to match the ever growing complexity of the world economy.
At different times in our history a varying set of simple indicators seemed successfully to summarize the state of monetary policy and its relationship to the economy. Thus, during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, trends in money supply, first M1, then M2, were useful guides. We could convey the thrust of our policy with money supply targets, though we felt free to deviate from those targets for good reason. This presumably helped the Congress, after the fact, to monitor our contribution to the performance of the economy. I should add that during this period we maintained a fully detailed analysis of the economy, in part, to make sure that money supply was still emitting reliable signals about the state of the economy.
Unfortunately, money supply trends veered off path several years ago as a useful summary of the overall economy. Thus, to keep the Congress informed on what we are doing, we have been required to explain the full complexity of the substance of our deliberations, and how we see economic relationships and evolving trends.
There are some indications that the money demand relationships to interest rates and income may be coming back on track. It is too soon to tell, and in any event we can not in the future expect to rely a great deal on money supply in making monetary policy. Still, if money growth is better behaved, it would be helpful in the conduct of policy and in our communications with the Congress and the public. In the absence of simple, summary indicators, we will continue our detailed evaluation of economic developments. As we seek price stability and maximum sustainable growth, the changing economic structures constantly present more analytic challenges.
I doubt the tasks will become any easier for the Federal Reserve as we move into the twenty-first century. The Congress willing, we will remain as the guardian of the purchasing power of the dollar. But one factor that will continue to complicate that task is the increasing difficulty of pinning down the notion of what constitutes a stable general price level.
When industrial product was the centerpiece of the economy during the first two-thirds of this century, our overall price indexes served us well. Pricing a pound of electrolytic copper presented few definitional problems. The price of a ton of cold rolled steel sheet, or a linear yard of cotton broad woven fabrics, could be reasonably compared over a period of years.
But as the century draws to a close, the simple notion of price has turned decidedly ambiguous. What is the price of a unit of software or a legal opinion? How does one evaluate the price change of a cataract operation over a ten-year period when the nature of the procedure and its impact on the patient changes so radically. Indeed, how will we measure inflation, and the associated financial and real implications, in the twenty-first century when our data--using current techniques--could become increasingly less adequate to trace price trends over time?
So long as individuals make contractual arrangements for future payments valued in dollars, there must be a presumption on the part of those involved in the transaction about the future purchasing power of money. No matter how complex individual products become, there will always be some general sense of the purchasing power of money both across time and across goods and services. Hence, we must assume that embodied in all products is some unit of output and hence of price that is recognizable to producers and consumers and upon which they will base their decisions. Doubtless, we will develop new techniques of price measurement to unearth them as the years go on. It is crucial that we do, for inflation can destabilize an economy even if faulty price indexes fail to reveal it.
But where do we draw the line on what prices matter? Certainly prices of goods and services now being produced--our basic measure of inflation--matter. But what about futures prices or more importantly prices of claims on future goods and services, like equities, real estate, or other earning assets? Are stability of these prices essential to the stability of the economy?
Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy.
The public examination of Federal Reserve actions extends well beyond our stewardship of monetary policy. Our overall management of the Federal Reserve System should, and does, come under considerable scrutiny by the Congress. Since we expend unappropriated taxpayer funds, we have an especial obligation to be prudent and efficient with the use of those funds. I am not particularly concerned about the one-third of our annual $2 billion budget that is expended to provide financial services to the private sector in competition with other providers. Such services include the clearing of checks, the operation of the Fedwire system, and the processing of automated clearing house payments. We are reimbursed for those services, and at competitive prices still make a reasonable profit for the Treasury. If we became inefficient and uncompetitive, we would be priced out of the market, and eventually out of that line of business.
An additional one-sixth of our expenses are for providing services to the Treasury and other agencies of government for which we are subject to reimbursement with appropriated funds. For the remainder, which mainly covers monetary policy, supervision and regulation of banks, and currency operations, we have to be especially diligent, for there is no external arbiter.
The rapidly changing technologies of recent years are pressing us to review thoroughly our structure and operations. We have already engaged in major consolidations of operations when such consolidations have been made cost effective by the newer technologies. Although in my experience the Federal Reserve System has been responsible, efficient, and has performed well, the rapidly changing external environment frequently requires us to rethink our role and mission. Even where we can be competitive, it is not the role of a government agency, especially one vested with an unsurpassable credit rating, to seek out all available market opportunities. Accordingly, where specific priced services have become effectively and competitively provided by private sector suppliers, the Federal Reserve needs to reassess whether the extent of our participation in those services fulfills a reasonable public purpose. There are, of course, certain services that the Congress has, and will in the future, deem appropriate for us to subsidize. But these areas presumably will remain circumscribed.
As a step in our periodic reassessment, a special committee of Federal Reserve Board governors and Reserve Bank presidents has been set up to review our priced services operations and other Systemwide activities.
Another step has been to engage outside accounting firms to audit the Federal Reserve Board and the twelve Reserve Banks. We had been quite satisfied with the Board as general auditor of the Reserve Banks since 1914. But the range of activities and the reach of the Federal Reserve in recent years requires us to address the perception that we are auditing ourselves without the full arm's length relationship deemed appropriate in today's environment.
Finally, the substantial changes under way in bank risk management are pressing us to continuously alter our modes of supervision and regulation to keep them as effective and efficient as possible.
Most importantly, all of our recent initiatives, especially the strengthening of the payments system and supervision, are critical to a central mission of the Federal Reserve, to maintain financial stability and reduce and contain systemic risks. This mission is an extension of our monetary policy. Our country can not enjoy the long-run "maximum employment and stable prices" objectives we are given for monetary policy if the financial system is unstable. In this regard, the successes that most please us are not so much the visible problems that we solve, but rather all the potential crises that could have happened, but didn't.
Doubtless, the most important defense against such crises is prevention. Recent mini-crises have identified the rapidly mushrooming payments system as the most vulnerable area of potential danger. We have no tolerance for error in our electronic payment systems. Like a breakdown in an electric power grid, small mishaps create large problems. Consequently, we have endeavored in recent years, as the demands on our system have escalated (we clear $1-1/2 trillion a day on Fedwire), to build in significant safety redundancies. This has been costly in terms of equipment and buildings.
Along with our other central bank colleagues, we are always looking for ways to reduce the risks that the failure of a single institution will ricochet around the world, shutting down much of the world payments system, and significantly undermining the world's economies. Accordingly, we are endeavoring to get as close to a real time transaction, clearing, and settlement system as possible. This would sharply reduce financial float and the risk of breakdown. Meaningful progress has already been made in this direction.
This evening I have tried to put current central banking issues in historical context. Monetary arrangements, including central banks, naturally are under constant scrutiny and criticism. This is no less true of the Federal Reserve in 1996 than of the gold standard in 1896. Central banks need to respond patiently and responsibly to the commentary, and we need to adapt to changing circumstances in markets and the economy.
A democratic society requires a stable and effectively functioning economy. I trust that we and our successors at the Federal Reserve will be important contributors to that end.
ESCAPE
Escape
Another day goes without any change
The feeling we live with still remains
We're stuck in a hole and we're searching for anything to hold onto
There has to be somewhere that we can be safe from the lives we live each day
There has to be somewhere that we can be far away...
We have to escape and I will go anywhere if you just lead the way
Escape to a place where we'll be together, together everyday
We have to escape....
We could be living how we wanted to
Instead of doing things we're forced to do
With no one to tell us that we should be going throughwhat they went through
There has to be some place that nobody knows, somewhere we can only go
There has to be some place that we can be all alone....
We have to escape...
女朋友
今天又是下雨天，心情开始变坏。想起温哥华，上海，还有天气阴暗的欧洲，爱丁堡的城堡。
今天和WENDY生气，中午冲进HOLT RENFREW差点拎了一个BURBERRY包出来。后来想想，生气不能暴饮暴食，当然也不能胡买东西，最好的办法还是打电话骚扰别人。我最近才知道为什么以前听说有人会在生气的时候买东西，这一定是一个非常普通的心理病症。8月一个朋友结婚，给她买结婚礼物的时候，就给自己买了一件更贵的首饰。期中考试没有考好，就跑到香蕉共和国…冲进冲出半个小时，却拎大包东西。好像心情不好的时候刷卡了就不心疼了。
真搞不明白她有了KPMG男朋友怎么还因为我不陪她逛街生气。气死我了，说什么从前我们每天通电话，还老一起出去吃蛋糕。我在公司电话里面好言相劝： dear, nothing has been changed, we’re still the same. 她那边大发脾气：“这样听起来就更古怪了，好像我们在谈恋爱呢？”果然，回头看看，给我递复印件的同事一连窃笑。我耸肩：女朋友。我怎么周围净是漫画人物。
失恋的时候到我家狂用纸巾，恋爱的时候不敢和男朋友吵架就来和我吵架。我觉得我对她够好的了，当然她都我也很好。比如让我去她家吃火鸡。我知道她下次她见到我又会说：虽然你有点古怪，但是我们都习惯了。我知道她的愿望就是，我和她介绍的那些WENDY’S 小老板，按摩所股东，预备律师等其中一个约会了再和她和KPMG一起成双成对，比如周末去酒吧喝一杯RUM ON ROCK，她就会高兴了。
其实我更加难受的是，为什么我和她一样的经历，一样的专业背景。我怎么就和她不一样的生活？
October 25, 2005
温暖的感动
真的很喜欢新生活
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来加几年了，一直还自诩为新移民，我骨子不想改变这种称号，因为我自豪自己说着带大陆口音的普通话，身上有着中国移民的气质，脑子都是东方的思维方式。我想若干年以后我的英语再好，我还是喜欢说中文。
记得曾去一个教会，教会很兴旺，大部份人说的是白话，而我还是喜欢说普通话的教会。虽然我们这些大陆来的新移民说着最普通的，并且夹着各地口音的中文，但我却倍感亲切。就象新生活给我的感觉一样，一种心灵的归宿感。
这一期的新生活又拿回来了，草绿色的封面，我很喜欢的颜色，那么地欣欣向荣，朝气蓬勃，上面稚气而充满动力的图画，让我想起外甥女孩提时趴在桌子上用功作画的样子。
翻开里面的内容，稍稍觉得少了一点，但已经很满足了，因为这是我们卡城移民自己的报纸，每一篇都是渗透了编辑们的辛苦，每一篇都是业余写手们的结精，而且篇篇都出色出彩。
每一期的新生活总会有一到两篇文章我最喜欢，我重新又在我的电脑上打一遍，存在自己的文件里，偶尔会再打开拿出来欣赏一下，在无人的时候独品这一杯好酒，享受一下孤独。
我没有收集报纸的习惯，而新生活我也弄不见了好几期，看到华枫有些网友们都有收藏了新生活的习惯，真是觉得这是见证一个我们共同的孩子的成长最好的礼物，也从侧面折射出了新生活拥趸们对它的喜爱程度。一份报纸能做到此，已经可以说是成功了大半了，以后的路只需要顺着这个方向一直追下去，不要为名、利、势、政治等所左右就可以了。
原本以为新生活是周刊，后来和朋友算了算，原来是双周刊。
我在心里默祷，愿新生活办得越来越好，让我们这些新移民不断地看到更多的新品精品。
__________________
我不收割，
留下天堂，身临其境。
秋天歌唱，满脸是家乡灯火。
这一年春天的雷暴不会将我们轻轻放过。
新生活, "GARBAGE CAN" or "I CAN" ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
虽然说太阳每天都是新的，凡人却终究架不住每日奔波的辛苦，疲劳的眼神底下世界已经没有新东西值得额外一眼。然而，2005年的某个时候，新生活周刊翩翩向我走来，轻轻地说，我就是写给你的。
哦，是吗？这个免费的午餐要向我证明什么呢？
没有花里胡哨的图片，没有哗众取宠的文字，一点亲切、一点热烈的感觉，透过墨香发送出来，已经足够了。
新生活是卡尔家里华人移民的半月谈。
不再叫做马甲了，某些网虫忽然有了正式的笔名，偶尔在新生活上按个手印。瞎扯淡的口水在铅墨文字号召力之下竟然也有板有眼。
薄薄的新生活周刊，一期一期积累下来，俨然给人以厚重的感觉。
为着这种感觉，我要新生活一起搬进我的新家。
其它的报刊——"GARBAGE CAN!"
女儿这时候插话了："I CAN!"
新生活, 要的就是这种"I CAN!"的态度。
__________________
花开花落春秋
我的眼窝浅，看见其它编辑转来本地论坛的评论的时候眼睛还是湿润了。
十期了，我和PUBLISHER姐姐说，我都不知道自己可以坚持这样久。她说，你对自己还不了解。工作忙得要死，感冒了两个星期，居然一天假都没有请。每个周六不是在编辑部加班就是在公司里加班。老板一到周五就提醒我：年假不可以CARRY OVER的。我说换成钱吧。
编辑部的同事们也都一样，全是有全职工作，还在为杂志一通乱忙。有的时候打电话给编辑，那边说，我把孩子哄睡了再给你打电话吧。我心里全是惭愧。因为我是这里最不懂事，最以为理所当然的一个。
因为休息的少，杂志社的同事一个挨一个的感冒，体育版的点点一病三个星期，还得上班，还得给杂志加班。
上次的选题，是从中加关系和孩子教育中选出来的。
星期6进编辑部的时候，看见桌子上摊了一大堆儿童画。还在奇怪，那边回答说：都是父母送过来的。心里一动，就想掉眼泪，还是装做若无其事。只是觉得自己在做一件有意义的事情，虽然我没有孩子，可是我喜欢看那些黑头发的孩子说中国话。
上个周末有送义工说我们的杂志被大纪元扔掉了，气得在论坛发贴骂人。
心里又是感动。很奇怪的是，我们发杂志的地方，甚至广告客户都和它们重叠。
也把杂志发给一个专业编辑看，受到了严重批评，说主题根本就可以深挖。这样的形式没有分量。还问我看没有看过“三联周刊”。我没有辩解，我们的确不可以和一个国内正规的媒体比，我们BURN的全是自己的生命能量。对我而言，我是找原因让自己不停感动。
October 20, 2005
乳房崇拜
欧仁·德拉克卢瓦
《自由引导人民》
乳房崇拜
路过市中心的商场，今年的本地设计师的设计的文胸又陈列在时装展示台的地方拍卖。大致看了一下，有的是两只飞船，有的是数百块红色水果糖，有的是象漏勺一样金属的带小洞的两只碗…我最喜欢的设计还是去年的冠军两只的鸟巢，有纤细的树枝，还有零星的粉色花朵，旁边息着两只蓝色的小小鸟儿。其中的宁静和温馨，仿佛是谁的小小天堂。
这样的文胸设计比赛已经成为一个传统。获奖作品展示会的时候，看那些瘦得象竹竿一样的金发女子，胸口穿着花花绿绿夸张的胸饰摇摇摆摆的走过，仿佛是一件可笑的漫画，你一点也不觉得那本来是一件房内穿的衣物；在中国女子那里细软香甜躲躲藏藏的闺中绣物。
去年的这个时候，二十年没有什么战绩的本埠冰球队突然把邻城的劲敌打败了。从此全城上下都开始穿戴冰球队的红色衣服，随着球队的节节胜利，整个城市都沸腾了。城市中心著名的酒吧街，在主场半决赛出线的胜利的夜晚成为了狂欢的街道。短短的一英里的街道，挤了5万人。看球的女孩子都坐在男朋友的肩膀上，比赛一样各自把上衣掀起，露出胸部；或有文胸，或不着一物。
那一场狂欢的盛况，被电视台的摄像机一扫无遗，当天夜里就在电视台播放出来，虽然把露胸的女孩子的面目掩去，却是酥胸与落霞齐飞。当时在场的好事者也奇多，闪光灯一片，第二天就在冰球迷的网站上看见本城年轻女子的春光无限。当然，也成为最热门的话题，这样庆祝冰球队的胜利是不是太出格了。然而觉得最有意思的还不是那些互相比赛胸前美丽的年轻女子，而是那些把她们抗在肩膀上的年轻男子们。你可以想象他们都是体壮如牛的，把自己女人扛在肩膀上多少要些力气。他们难道不怕别的男人看了自己女朋友的“ASSET” 吗？倒是让人想起了在卢浮宫看见的那幅名画《自由引导人民》，这份颇具政治意味的油画中最枪眼的不是法兰西的三色旗帜，而是自由女神健康洁白的乳房。似乎只有裸胸的女神挥舞旗帜才更显示有无所畏惧，倾其所有的英雄气概。而这和胜利的人群中，纷纷露出的胸口，仿佛表现的是同一种英勇。但是，后者却是倾其所能的狂欢。
年少的时候读安德鲁•马韦尔(Andrew Marvell) 《致羞涩的情人》的时候，不觉得其可爱。成年以后再读，突然理解所谓享乐主义的浪漫情怀。他没有说“五花马，千斤裘，呼儿将出换美酒，与尔同销万古愁。” 这样的诗人的豪情壮语，却更愿意把时间沉浸一个羞怯的女子的爱情里，更愿意把两百年时间花在赞美美丽的胸部罢了。
我会用一百年的时间赞美 An hundred years should go to praise
你的眼睛，凝视你的额眉 Thine eyes and on thy forehead gaze;
花两百年的时间爱慕你的每个乳房 Two hundred to adore each breast,
三万年才赞赏完其它的地方 But thirty thousand to the rest;
据说在特洛伊之战以后，美女海伦终于回到斯巴达王的手里，而那个被背叛的丈夫看到她裸露的乳房，在震惊之余他丢下利剑，原谅了这个惹来十年战争的红颜祸水。对于美丽的乳房，这个大概是比花上两百年赞美更高的礼遇了。
同是英国诗人的罗伯特•赫里克（Robert Herrick）赞美乳房的诗歌常常被放在爱情诗歌选里面。把她们比喻成白玫瑰和红玫瑰，把她们比喻成百合花，樱桃，鲜奶油。
Have you beheld (with much delight) 你可曾十分欣喜
A red rose peeping through a white? 一朵红玫瑰躲在白玫瑰之后
Or else a cherry (double graced) 或者双倍优雅的樱桃
With in a lily? Centre placed? 镶于百合花？正中？
而他写的《凌乱自得》(Delight in Disorder) 简直就是一幅宫廷的仕女写意图。半身为神职人员的清教徒诗人，他的一半的诗歌是宗教诗歌，而另外一半则是世俗有关，而美丽的乳房就是他世俗中的最美了。
前两个星期，“全国抗乳腺癌协会” 又组织了环城募捐义跑。围观者，奔跑者每个人的T-SHIRT上都别着一只小小的粉红色蝴蝶结。一家老少，推着孩子牵着狗，胸口别着“为我们的母亲奔跑” “为我的爱人奔跑” 的字牌。人数比去年还多，声势也更浩大了。现在你去HOLT RENFREW买一套口红，她们会给你一只带粉红蝴蝶结的小口袋，说是有部分钱已经捐给抗癌协会了。甚至你到Tim Horton喝杯咖啡，柜台上都有一只小小的粉红色蝴蝶结，你的一杯咖啡已经包含了给抗癌协会的捐助。这只小小的粉红色蝴蝶结无处不在，尤其是你看见那些女性把她们郑重的别再胸襟上的时候，你不由心存感动。
听说，纵观所有年龄段，每九个加拿大女性中就有一个有可能患乳腺癌。无论是闪耀在胜利的前面女神的乳房，还是值得爱情中的羞涩情人的美丽。生命是因为其脆弱而更加让人珍惜的。
October 19, 2005
这个世界上我最最疼爱的女生
她刚刚跑完北京的马拉松赛。：)
记者说很帅，要拿去作封面。
她爬过穆什塔格，明年爬珠穆朗玛
她考过有潜水教练证
冬天在北京业余教教滑雪
她爬攀岩，把我送的ESQ都给划坏了。
我的那只一样的是丢了。我们很多东西都一样买两份，然后送给对方。：)：)
因为一块儿长大的，我就以为她去的地方我都去过了。
她谈的恋爱，我好像也谈了。：)：)
October 17, 2005
世界上最可爱的老头
A hard act to follow
Oct 13th 2005
From The Economist print edition
Who could fill Alan Greenspan's shoes?
ON THE ground floor of the Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC, there is an electronic game which tests a visitor's skill at setting interest rates. You have to decide how to respond to events such as rising inflation or a stockmarket crash. If you get all the answers right, the machine declares you the next Fed chairman. In real life, because of huge uncertainties about data and how the economy works, there is no obviously right answer to the question of when to change interest rates. Nor is there any easy test of who will make the best Fed chairman. So who would The Economist select for the job?
Alan Greenspan will retire as Fed chairman on January 31st, after a mere 18 ½ years in the job. So George Bush needs to nominate a successor soon. Mr Bush has a penchant for picking his pals to fill top jobs: last week he nominated his personal lawyer Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court (see article). But his personal bank manager really would not cut the mustard as Fed chairman. This is the most important economic-policy job in America—indeed in the whole world. The Fed chairman sets interest rates with the aim of controlling inflation, which in turn helps determine the value of the dollar, the world's main reserve currency. It is hardly surprising that financial markets worldwide can rise or fall on his every word.
Financial markets are typically more volatile during the first year after the handover to a new chairman than during the rest of his tenure. In October 1987, barely two months after Mr Greenspan took office, the stockmarket crashed. Current conditions for a handover are hardly ideal. America's economy has never looked so unbalanced, with a negative household savings rate, a housing bubble, a hefty budget deficit, a record current-account deficit and rising inflation. Figures due on October 14th are expected to show that the 12-month rate of inflation has risen above 4%—its highest since 1991.
Monetary magic
Because Mr Greenspan is widely rated by investors as the greatest central banker ever, their confidence in his mystical powers has helped to hold down bond yields and prop up the dollar. But combine America's domestic and external financial deficits with a looming “Greenspan deficit” next year and markets could well push down the dollar and push up bond yields, thereby bursting the housing bubble. With inflationary pressures rising, the new Fed chairman will need to push short-term interest rates higher; there will be much less room to cut rates later, as Mr Greenspan did after the stockmarket bubble burst in 2001. Would any sane person want this job?
It is worth recalling that in 1987 many doubted whether Mr Greenspan could fill Paul Volcker's shoes. The skills required of a Fed chairman are indeed demanding. He or she needs to be an expert in monetary policy, have a good instinct for economic data and an insight into the big policy debates. A chairman must be respected by financial markets, able to keep a cool head in crises, and be politically independent, while well attuned to political opinion. Mere mortals need not apply.
All the main candidates commonly touted are highly respected economists who could be trusted to pursue a sound monetary policy, and yet each also has serious drawbacks (see article). President Bush said last week that he is looking for a successor to Mr Greenspan who would be seen as politically independent and who would thus inspire global confidence. Yet the leading candidates have all advised or worked for Mr Bush. Mr Greenspan, of course, also has close Republican ties, but financial markets will be less forgiving of his replacement. Any suspicion that Mr Bush has selected someone simply because he is a loyal Republican would undermine confidence in the next chairman, even before he takes office.
Expert and independent
If Mr Bush means what he says about the next chairman being politically independent, then we believe the best choice would be Don Kohn, a governor on the Federal Reserve Board, who is not affiliated to any party. Mr Kohn has another big advantage. As a staff member before being promoted to governor in 2002 on Mr Greenspan's recommendation, Mr Kohn has been attending the Fed's policy-making meetings for almost 24 years, even longer than Mr Greenspan. His vast experience of monetary-policy decisions and financial crises would be invaluable in troubled times. He is highly regarded by economists in the Fed and on Wall Street, and having worked with Mr Greenspan for so long, his thinking on interest-rate policy and financial markets is also close to the chairman's. He would offer continuity and a safe pair of hands.
Yet how can The Economist endorse Mr Greenspan's right-hand man, when we have long criticised the chairman for failing to curb the stockmarket bubble in the late 1990s, and later for propping up the economy by inflating a housing bubble? The answer is that the maestro seems to be changing his tune. In several recent speeches Mr Greenspan has expressed concern about the housing market and, in an apparent effort to talk it down, gave warning that prices could fall. There is a stronger case for restraining housing bubbles than stockmarket bubbles, because they tend to cause greater economic harm when they burst. His public view on the link between monetary policy and asset prices has also shifted. He now concedes that the Fed's success in delivering low inflation and interest rates may have made bubbles more likely, ironically, because investors are demanding less compensation for risk.
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Whether central banks should respond to asset-price bubbles is one of the hottest debates in monetary policy. The Fed's failure to curb bubbles, while aggressively easing policy when they burst, is partly to blame for America's imbalances, which could give the next Fed chairman a lot of grief. Mr Kohn's experience within the Fed makes him the best man to cope with this. Mr Greenspan could help him immeasurably and enhance his own legacy by going much further, and explicitly supporting the view of many other central banks that sometimes policymakers should act to restrain asset-price booms. When you are the world's greatest central banker, after all, you should be able to admit the odd mistake.
October 15, 2005
僵尸新娘：黑色的唯美主义
僵尸新娘：黑色的唯美主义
想骗好朋友的小女孩陪我去看动画片《僵尸新娘》，她犹豫了一下说：虽然是动画片，但是Tim Burton的电影总是带有黑暗的色彩。是的，这不是一部给9岁小女孩看的粉红色公主片，而是又一部给成人看的动画。
维多利亚女王时代，一对有钱的商人夫妇一直想进入上流社会，而一对贵族夫妇守着祖先留下来的大房子和贵族头衔，却生活窘迫。所以当两家商量联姻的时候，双家家长各自欢喜。而商人之子羞涩苍白的Victor和贵族小姐单纯天真的Victoria因为一曲钢琴曲一见钟情。好事多磨，羞涩的Victor在教堂婚礼上怎么也念不对那段新郎的婚礼宣言，还把丈母娘的裙子烧着了。他一个人步入森林苦闷的反复练习新郎宣言的时候，却把金色的结婚戒指戴在了僵尸新娘化作树干的手指上。
僵尸新娘有一个悲惨的身世，她是穿着母亲的婚纱等待和情人私奔的夜晚被杀害的。死后，她依然对成为别人的新娘念念不忘。对送上门来的Victor，她欣喜若狂，纠缠不放。落入阴曹地府的Victor，想念的是人间爱人。当他听说Victoria将嫁给另外一个贵族王，万念俱灰准备喝下毒药和僵尸新娘斯厮守阴间的时候，穿着洁白婚纱的人间爱人站在他们的身后。
如果说这部动画的情节其实和格林兄弟写的童话没有太大区别的话，它的动画造型却让人耳目一新。三个年轻人，僵尸新娘, 人间爱人，还有Victor，都有着极小的下巴，大大的眼睛，很多的眼白，看起来单薄而脆弱。而动画片中的其它人物造型都更像是我们在时事版出现的漫画，严重的比例失调，特征突出，或者说奇形怪状。
如果说《查理的巧克力工厂》中，Burton善于使用鲜艳的颜色对视觉的冲击来制造荒诞的效果。那么在《僵尸新娘》他就是将黑色，灰色，白色，蓝色的敏感度掌握得层次丰富的画家。一个真正的画家，可以用深浅不同的蓝色画出一个立体感很强娇艳欲滴的苹果。而《僵尸新娘》，就是用一个冷色调勾勒出来的娇艳欲滴的离奇童话。
我们毫不惊讶动画片中，骷髅的群魔乱舞。也不意外出人意料的大笑，和惊恐的尖叫。这些都是标新立异的Burton标牌伎俩。我们惊讶的是他在黑暗的色彩中，带来的唯美效果。人们说他的黑暗色调中，总有光亮的边界。而他的这部动画，从Victor的钢琴SOLO，到僵尸新娘纤细的腰肢，风中飘动的的绢般的头纱，那不仅是光亮的边缘，而是美丽的极致，唯美主义者令人窒息的脆弱高点。
在黑色坟墓的地下世界，你可以看到Burton对那个有蓝色眼睑，深蓝色毛线一样长发的，腮帮子都漏了一块儿的僵尸新娘的偏爱。她的每一个旋转都美仑美奂。她长长的有些破烂的婚纱，在黑暗中有若最精美的珍宝。你看见她在风中飘扬的时候，会感叹迪斯尼的《风中奇缘》的印度安公主Pocahantas的长发飘扬的多么粗糙，而《怪兽史来克》的Fiona公主的电脑制作的衣裙又多么缺乏人间丝帛的质感。Bruton让她唱：蜡烛烫到，尖刀割破，我都不会感觉疼痛…可是，为什么我还会落泪呢？
他甚至给她一束小小的玫瑰花束，让她在走出教堂的时候变成了一片片飞向月亮的花朵般的蝴蝶。
这部三维的木偶动画并不是给一个小女孩，或者给那些喜欢热闹的街头少年看的。它是黑暗中的精致婚纱，恶梦边缘的美梦。
哥德式建筑，巴赫般的钢琴曲，姑娘纤细的腰肢和蓬骨裙…它是给那些孤单得唯美的人看的。坟墓边都开放着中湿漉漉的蓝色的玫瑰花儿，亲爱的人，让我们把黑暗都诗化。
5点钟下班，回家洗了头发，6：45直奔电影院。
9点在WALMART买了一桶牛奶，两包燕麦棒，一大桶洗衣液。
10点钟坐在家里，吃饭。人物专访的小音乐家，留了两个录音电话，改改改。
11点和报纸的同事通完电话，开始写影评。一个多小时完成。出报纸多了，码字巨快。
才想起今天是弟弟生日，：)要打电话。
October 12, 2005
七里香
有一次为报纸作人物专访，地点是在大学附近最受欢迎的酒吧。酒吧里爱尔兰的背景音乐被嘈杂的人声遮掩的全无痕迹，烟气升腾在高高的后现代金属管架的屋顶上。对面的女子对我说：很奇怪，这么多年来，我常常在夕阳的余晖里，一瞬间不知道身在何时何地。那一瞬间，好像很久，好像自己丢失了。
隔着酒吧的烟雾，吵杂的人声，和混暗的灯光，我好像看见了她眼睛里的点点泪痕。其实，那是我自己眼里的斑斑点点模糊了视线。她用她的丢失旁证着我的，她用她的悲伤击中了我心底的。我突然知道在异乡街头行走的女子，无论多么坚强，眼前的美景都会在那一瞬荒芜成烟。
那个女子，北京出生，12岁就离开中国到了非洲的一个国家。她给我讲那个中非国家的年轻男子会在夏天穿白色的亚麻衬衫，胸口别一朵小小的白色茉莉花。所以那些个夏天的夜晚，他们经过，香气扑鼻。她给我讲，那个中非国家有古老的罗马式剧场，她曾经在那样陈旧的环形剧场里看中国的京剧，听那些锣鼓喧天在褪色的大理石柱间回旋。
后来，她又从非洲到了加拿大，读完了大学以后又从加拿大回到中国，工作了一段时间再从中国回到加拿大。对她来说，回到中国成为“回归” 回到加拿大也成为“回归” 。漂泊久了，这一刻的离开，已经成为另外一端的到达。
又就好像我，声称是一个北京的女孩，其实在襁褓里就从北京到了东北，又从东北到达大西北的西宁。虽然在北京渡过青春期，却在刚刚成人时来到加拿大。到今天，在加拿大待的时间和在北京成长的时间相等，在这个城市比在北京生活还要熟悉舒适。然而每次生病作梦，总是会梦见自己站在机场里，看来来往往的人群，一次次过关，还叮嘱着自己不要回头看，妈妈在背后流泪。
不管是不是真正的在流浪，我知道每个人心中的无依无靠的漂泊感被深深藏着，等着在另一个时刻被暮色夕阳，或另一个漂泊的人轻轻掘起。
所以读女诗人伊丽莎白•毕晓普（Elizabeth Bishop）的时候我静静的展开那种不知道今昔何昔，此地何地的迷失。毕晓普，被尊为最杰出美国女诗人，也被称为“无家的诗人” 。她童年在加拿大祖父母家长大，年轻时走过法国、西班牙、北非、爱尔兰、意大利、巴西，她每一本诗集都以旅行偶关，就是因为她的诗句似乎一直都在旅途中。就像《旅行问题》(Questions of Travel) 中，她反复问的是家在哪里。
Continent, city, country, society:
大陆，城市，乡村，社区
the choice is never wide and never free.
选择从未宽广从未自由
And here, or there . . . No. Should we have stayed at home,
而这里，或者那里，不，我们是不是应该待在家
wherever that may be?"
无所谓家在哪里？
诗人每次被被漂泊感击中的时候，那些疼痛就碎成了诗句。王小波曾经在他给李银行的情书中引用过这样的诗句：我们最终也会走向死亡，\ 但生命因一起看海而延长。女诗人蒂斯代尔Sara Teasdale却一直在看海，她把情书都写在海滩上。我相信小波引用两句的出处应该是她的《我思念过你》(I thought of you)
Around me were the echoing dunes, beyond me
The cold and sparkling silver of the sea --
We two will pass through death and ages lengthen
Before you hear that sound again with me.
我和那个同样来自北京，又在异乡相遇的女子在喧闹的酒吧里彼此相望，想起了各自的飘流。但是我们都不说出那种绝望，因为生命对于我们来说还有太长的路要成长。
于是下一次我们约在了星巴克的咖啡馆，从咖啡厅望出去可以看见这里最为流行的“香蕉共和国” 专卖店。那家店的女装喜欢用纯丝纯毛和精致剔透的蕾丝，你翻开她们昂贵的标签上面80%写着： MADE IN CHINA-这也许是为什么我如此喜欢这个品牌的原因。离开咖啡店的时候，那个女子突然回身抱了星巴克的两只厚厚的白瓷杯子。她付了钱，交给我一只，说：你没有觉得吗？这样厚厚的瓷杯子，很温暖。
在夕阳中站立常常不知何去何从，仿佛一个失忆在另一个星球的我们，需要白瓷杯子那样厚厚的温暖。其实我不用看它的杯底也知道，上面印着：MADE IN CHINA。
它们和我们一样，在同一地点生产，又走了同样的直线到达这里。
夜里的时候，我对那个瓷杯子念了些诗句。从古诗到我的EMILY，然而我合上眼念得那一句是：
在绿树白花的篱前
曾那样轻易地挥手道别
而沧桑的二十年后
我们的魂魄却夜夜归来
微风拂过时
便化作满园的郁香
October 11, 2005
人人都有一本花钱的“经”
人人都有一本花钱的“经”
午餐时间在办公室的厨房间碰见婚假结束的新娘，东海岸的蜜月让她满面春风。我自然而然夸奖她婚礼上的百合花束、绿色长春藤围绕的红色地毯、还有唱诗班无伴奏的童声合唱。站在一边的我的前任女老板，就忍不住了，对我们大声说：把数月数月的时间，数千数千的金钱都花在一场婚礼上简直是浪费。
女老板三十出头，未婚女强人，每天工作10个小时，没有男朋友，只有两匹纯种欧洲赛马，三只美国蓝猫。
而刚度完蜜月的新娘，SAP技术高手，每年被公司送去接受学费上万元的BW培训。四年时间恋爱，一年时间准备盛大婚礼。
两个生活目标不同的加拿大女子就站在有5台微波炉、4台自动售货机，2台饮水机的厨房里互相指责对方的花钱方式。
后来，这场指责论证又转移到E-MAIL的战场，作为吵架目击者证人，我被放在了CC栏。新娘说：我认为嫁一个人，结一次盛大的婚礼比养两匹马要强得多。女强人回复：我的两匹马一共价值7万加元，那足够你一场更豪华的婚礼了吧？新娘回复：太多了，我的婚礼仅仅花了3万加元。
我把邮件又转发给公司的好朋友。作为一个单身母亲，她对新娘和女强人的花钱方式更为愤愤不平，她回复：如果她们有孩子，就不会这样了。她们需要给孩子买衣服、带她们去一次麦当劳、买钢琴、学芭蕾舞、送她们去儿童夏季夏令营…你还要积攒给她们读大学的教育资金…我知道这笔帐可以无限延伸，还要带她们去冬天学习滑雪，夏天去迪斯尼，穿GAP的外套，TOMMY的牛仔裤。
每个人都有花钱的方式，而且每个人看别人的花钱方式不同还都会心疼，目睹她们的讨论，我开始打听周围年轻女子的花钱方式。
朋友A，会计师事务所资深会计，因为工作压力大，一休假就会去旅游。每次到了机场才会给我打电话，说，我去古巴度假，一个星期以后回来。
朋友B，从会计师事务所跳到银行又跳到石油公司，就是为工资一级一级跳。从国内出来的她从来不乱花一分钱，因为要给在青岛的父母买一套小别墅再给自己添一个公寓。
朋友C，工作之余喜欢作义工：教堂、社区，义卖义务授课。所以她的日常消费中重要的一项是每个星期写给教堂的捐助支票。她还在世界卫生组织那里领养了两个非洲的小孩，一个男孩一个女孩。
至于我，和加拿大大部分给大公司打工的白领一样，工资的1/3交给了加拿大联邦和省税务局、工资的另外1/5支付了公司的各类保险和福利、工资的1/8给自己买了养老退休金…年底拿到的分红刚刚够买一张飞回中国看父母的机票。除去每天喝两杯“星巴克” 咖啡以外，每周看几场电影，剩下的MONEY，既不够供一个房子又不舍得换一部“甲壳虫” 敞蓬车，只好买一些升得不太快也跌得不太快的加拿大股票。
当然准备一个盛大的婚礼，还是养纯种赛马，都已经是比较奢侈的花钱方式。一个在学校拿全“A ”才挤进我们公司的洋师妹连“星巴克” 咖啡都不舍得喝，她说这里的房租那么贵，一定要攒钱买房才对。
刚刚听说，因为ALBERTA经济繁荣，不但失业率一直低于4%而且省政府财政资金出现巨额盈余，因此每个纳税人在圣诞节都可以拿到400加元的“繁荣奖励” 支票。当然这个消息的背面是：这个城市已经迅速成为加拿大人均生活水准最高的城市，年人均生活消费是4.1万加元(相当于25万人民币) 。
圣经说：美酒使人快活，而钱能使万事应心。(传道篇10：19)
每个人都在努力挣钱，每个人都在小心地花钱。
城市的生活越来越昂贵，每个人心中都有一个花钱的“帐本” 。
October 03, 2005
音乐传奇
他们的音乐让人战栗，让人的血液象夏季热带草原的河流一样奔腾的无法控制。
Gwhyneth Chen 和世界顶级的指挥Edmon Colomer，
拉赫曼尼诺夫piano concerto no 3 in D major, opus 30
普罗高非夫piano concerto no 3 in C major opus 26,是我第一次现场听。
不仅仅是音乐，和灵魂之漂流，Gwhyneth名师Pogorelich的爱情故事也是一个传奇。
她说，多年以后我在香港看见他，这样的顶级大师居然演奏要看谱了，你可以知道失去爱情对他的彻底损坏。因为对于钢琴，他即使大脑已经不记得了，手指也应该还记得，那是一双数十年一天弹奏12个小时天才的手啊。
我的眼泪几乎掉下来了。
Gwhyneth Chen 和Edmon Colomer，
一个信奉佛教，一个基督徒。
坐在对面，听他们各自讲音乐，听他们讲音乐和宗教的个人体验，觉得整个大脑会错位。眼前出现的是中世纪教堂的展翅而飞的小天使，和Chris Paschke的中国字抽象画，或者Wassily Kandinsley的大块色彩的彩陀螺。
我不停的说，我们的话题一直在长翅膀飞行于精神之上，我们谈谈这个城市，天气好不好？
October 02, 2005
如果你是郭靖
http://www8.tianyaclub.com/publicforum/Content/no05/1/3922.shtml
因为看到上面的文章，列下面我最喜欢的男人的前三名是
一， 格林斯潘，凡是有他名字的新闻我必翻开看，每天早上泡在澡盆里的狂老头，实在让人无法不崇拜他
二， Steve Jobs, 他比Alan年轻，还好看，但是一样牛。我觉得每个喜欢I POD的女人都应该喜欢他
三， 李宗盛，连我也不知道为什么那么喜欢他。大概是因为他长得太家居，做人不象罗大佑那么凛冽吧，平凡男人小才子
打油诗一首
如果你是谭嗣同，我可不可以是一个女英雄
你自横天笑，我为劫法场练轻功
如果你是白郎宁，我可不可以是E Barrett
会写十四行，就可以有爱情
如果你是郭靖，我可不可以是黄蓉
你笨我聪明，一起守襄阳城
如果你是武大郎，我可不可不姓潘
你小巧我玲珑，你挑担子我烙饼：))
：-)