兰格格：在海一方

华尔街时报：石油暴发城市Calgary的阴暗面

8月30日头条，说Calgary的暴发户赶600英里的路去温哥华买法拉利和奔驰。--多象老农赶集啊。

Calgary每天有70个新进入城市的居民--外面谣传是每天一两辆旅游大BUS

Calgary的房价猛涨，无家可归的人比去年同期多了3500人，很多人在住帐篷。WTJ的报道说一个油漆工因为房东把房子高价买了，他没有地方住，所以目前只好住帐篷。--不太可信，现在连油漆工都很不得收费$50/小时了，上次给我清洁家的清洁工都收$100/小时，他怎么可能没有钱租房子？

Calgary的办公楼的空房率几乎为零。--这个我看过文章，说是千分之2空房率，比经济繁盛时的东京，伦敦还俏。

经济学家预测，到2025年的时候，ALBERTA省的劳动力会短缺335，000人。--我准备从现在开始存钱，投资做帐篷生意，到那个时候，CALGARY的帐篷(最好是两室一厅的)都可以买上1万一顶了。

--上面的数字全是记的，文章是在办公室看的，回家上网发现WSJ要79美元一年，还是网上用户阿。这也是CALGARY的一个阴暗面，白领还没有清洁阿姨有钱呢。

China's growing pains

Some Chinese experts have gone far beyond the ILO in their warnings of future unemployment problems. Government researchers have estimated that the true unemployment rate in Chinese cities is around 7 to 8% because many of the jobless are not officially registered. With an estimated 150 million surplus workers still on the farms and villages of the Chinese countryside, analysts have suggested that China needs to create 25 million new jobs a year to absorb rural migrants and school graduates over the next several years. According to the ILO report, China's mediocre rate of job creation is a result of two main factors: the shedding of jobs at poorly performing state-owned enterprises, which have eliminated 30 million jobs in recent years; and the long-term structural shift from employment-intensive growth to capital-intensive growth as the country modernizes.

It's one of the strangest paradoxes of modern China: a booming economy and an emerging scarcity of labour in key industries, even as millions of ordinary Chinese suffer from a sharp rise in unemployment. Those two contradictory trends could jeopardize China's economic miracle if they are neglected by the Communist government, a new report by the International Labour Organization warned yesterday. With the outside world still in awe of its economic growth, China's poor record in job creation has gone relatively unnoticed. But the ILO report is calling on China to focus on creating more jobs and better jobs for the flood of new entrants to its labour force, who number more than four million annually. From 2000 to 2004, China's economy grew by a stunning 51%. Yet in the same period, there was only a modest 5% rise in the number of jobs, the ILO report noted. And the official unemployment rate increased to 4.2%, compared with 3.1% in 2000 and just 2.5% in 1990. “China has seen a tremendous slowdown in the number of jobs being created, compared to GDP growth,” the report said. “Given the steady increase in unemployment, job creation needs to be placed at the forefront of the policy debate.”

Some Chinese experts have gone far beyond the ILO in their warnings of future unemployment problems. Government researchers have estimated that the true unemployment rate in Chinese cities is around 7 to 8% because many of the jobless are not officially registered. With an estimated 150 million surplus workers still on the farms and villages of the Chinese countryside, analysts have suggested that China needs to create 25 million new jobs a year to absorb rural migrants and school graduates over the next several years. According to the ILO report, China's mediocre rate of job creation is a result of two main factors: the shedding of jobs at poorly performing state-owned enterprises, which have eliminated 30 million jobs in recent years; and the long-term structural shift from employment-intensive growth to capital-intensive growth as the country modernizes.

Downturn leads to higher risk of U.S. recession

环球邮报说美国房市会对2007年的GDP造成影响，而增加RECESSION的风险。

纽约时报则强调，中国等廉价劳动力的市场对美国的影响。假如国际投资者不再对美国投资，那么会造成什么影响。FED 希望这些变化不要对就业市场产生大COST。这怎么可能。美国对非MANUFACTORY产业的依赖，必然让它在对国际贸易，和减小通货膨胀压力的时候对就业市场产生负面的影响。Ben Bernanke的工作难做阿。：)

The catalyst, a pair of weak housing reports, led them to cut their 2007 U.S. gross domestic product forecast to 1.9 per cent from a projection of 2.4 per cent offered earlier this summer. They also lowered their target for personal consumption growth to 1.4 per cent from 2.3 per cent, a development that would "set the stage for a recession in U.S. profits."

Downturn leads to higher risk of U.S. recession
ROMA LUCIW

From Globe and Mail

Mounting evidence of a slowdown in the U.S. housing market has led some forecasters to increase the chances that the world's largest economy will be limping into a recession next year.

"We have decided to raise the odds of a U.S. hard landing to 40 per cent from 25 per cent," National Bank Financial economists Clément Gignac and Stéfane Marion said in a note yesterday.

The catalyst, a pair of weak housing reports, led them to cut their 2007 U.S. gross domestic product forecast to 1.9 per cent from a projection of 2.4 per cent offered earlier this summer. They also lowered their target for personal consumption growth to 1.4 per cent from 2.3 per cent, a development that would "set the stage for a recession in U.S. profits."

In a further sign of trouble, an index that foreshadows turning points in the U.S. economy suggests things will get worse before they get better. The Economic Cycle Research Institute's weekly leading index annualized growth rate fell to a 179-week low yesterday, its worst level in more than three years.

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"The growth rate has been falling steadily since January," said Anirvan Banerji, director of research at the independent forecasting group, based in New York. "That suggests that as far as the eye can see, the U.S. economy will keep slowing, at least through early 2007."

Mr. Banerji said it is too early to tell if the index is pointing to an actual recession, but would not rule out that possibility. "We are certainly not seeing any indication of a revival in economic growth."

One impact of the housing slowdown is that job creation in the construction industry -- which has been soaring in recent years -- has gone into reverse, he said.

An end to the housing boom will pressure home prices, leaving Americans feeling poorer and curbing consumer spending. "Until a few months ago, home prices were rising and people felt as if they were worth more and assumed that they were okay spending money," Mr. Banerji said.

"That cushion has now disappeared."

The first bearish housing report, released Thursday, showed that January new-home sales posted their largest drop since February while builders' inventories jumped to a record. A separate report from Wednesday showed sales of previously owned homes dropped to a 2½-year low and the inventory of unsold homes rose to a record high.

"In light of the swift buildup of the inventory of unsold homes, it is only a matter of time before prices decline at the national level," Mr. Gignac and Mr. Marion said. A "deterioration of household net worth, at a time when the sum of the household energy bill and financial obligations has risen to a record share of disposable income, will force consumers to rebuild their savings rate."

New and existing homes set sales records for five years as low mortgage rates and healthy employment created nearly ideal buying conditions. Interest rates, however, have risen in recent years as the U.S. Federal Reserve tried to keep inflation in check. After 17 straight increases, the Fed opted to leave interest rates unchanged at 5.25 per cent this month.

Paul McCulley, managing director and portfolio manager with California's Pacific Investment Management Co., which manages the world's largest bond fund, said the Fed will need to shift to a neutral or accommodative stance by next year.

A weak housing market will stifle economic growth over the next few quarters, cutting consumption and restraining job growth, Mr. McCulley told Reuters at the annual economic retreat hosted by the Kansas City Fed. At this point, he said, the property market is "crying uncle" and close to "screaming uncle."

Global Trends May Hinder Effort to Curb U.S. Inflation
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By EDMUND L. ANDREWS
Published: August 28, 2006
JACKSON HOLE, Wyo., Aug. 27 — As the Federal Reserve fiercely debates how to reduce inflation within the United States, economists are warning that trends outside the country may soon make the Fed’s job much harder.

In recent years, global integration has made things easier for the Fed in two ways. An explosion in low-cost exports from China and other countries helped keep prices of many products low even as Americans spent heavily and loaded up on debt.

At the same time, China and other relatively poor nations reversed the normal patterns of global investment by becoming net lenders to the United States and Europe. Analysts estimate that this “uphill’’ flow of money from poor nations to rich ones may have reduced long-term interest rates in the United States by 1.5 percentage points in recent years — a big difference when home mortgage rates are about 6 percent.

But as Fed officials held their annual retreat this weekend here in the Grand Tetons, a growing number of economists warned that those benign international trends could abate or even reverse.

For one thing, they said, China’s explosive rise as a low-cost manufacturer does not mean that prices will fall year after year. Indeed, China’s voracious appetite for oil and raw materials has aggravated inflation by driving up global prices for oil and many commodities.

Beyond that, new research presented this weekend suggested that the United States could not count on a continuation of cheap money from poor countries. Those flows could stop as soon as countries find ways to spend their excess savings at home.

“Medium- and long-term interest rates are set outside of the country,’’ said Kenneth S. Rogoff, a professor of economics at Harvard University and a former director of research at the International Monetary Fund. “It’s very important to think about what to do if the winds of globalization change.’’

The warnings come as the Fed’s new chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, faces widespread skepticism among economists about his forecast for a “soft landing” — a mild slowdown that will tame inflation without costing many jobs.

Inflation is already running above Mr. Bernanke’s unofficial target — 2 percent a year, excluding energy and food prices — and few analysts here say they believe the Fed will raise rates and slow growth enough to bring inflation down to its target anytime soon.

“They are in a box, and they know it,” said John H. Makin, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute and a hedge fund manger. “It’s an awkward position for them to be in.”

Economists presenting papers at the Fed retreat said that the central bank may be hindered as global trends that have kept inflation and interest rates lower than they would otherwise be turn less favorable.

The biggest change could be an increased reluctance by foreign investors to finance the United States’ huge trade gap, now more than $700 billion a year.

“What happens if foreign investors decide they don’t want to accumulate American assets any more?” asked Martin S. Feldstein, economics professor at Harvard and president of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

“Something has to change to make the debt more attractive — an increase in interest rates in the U.S. or a decline in the exchange rate of the dollar,’’ he continued. “In the short term, the Fed will face slowing output growth, possible with higher inflation.”

For the moment, bond investors appear to accept the Fed’s view that inflation will remain low. Long-term interest rates have actually edged down slightly since the Fed decided on Aug. 8 not to raise overnight rates.

But economists, including some leading bond investors, predict that inflation will creep higher even if oil prices stop climbing.

“The consensus among people here is that the Fed’s real target is not 2 percent but about 2.5 percent,’’ said David Hale, an economic forecaster in Chicago. Looking ahead 12 months, if Fed members do not make progress bringing inflation down, “it’s going to call into question their credibility,’’ he said.

Members of the Federal Open Market Committee, which sets monetary policy, appear torn. In a sign of uncertainty this weekend, Mr. Bernanke and all other senior Fed policymakers were unusually tight-lipped about any of the issues — wage trends, the ability of companies to pass higher costs on to customers, or the plunge in home sales — that are at top of their agenda.

Mr. Bernanke has been arguing that inflation will cool as annual economic growth slows to 2.5 percent, from about 3.5 percent.

But some Fed officials, worried that inflation pressures are becoming more entrenched, want to take tougher action. Jeffrey M. Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, voted against the pause in rate increases.

Michael H. Moskow, president of the Chicago Fed, strongly suggested last week that he favored higher rates and declared that the risks of higher inflation were greater than the risks of an unexpectedly sharp slowdown. Mr. Moskow is not currently a voting member of the policy committee, which rotates the regional bank presidents, but he participated in the debates.

Ethan S. Harris, chief United States economist at Lehman Brothers, said the Fed’s focus on core inflation understated the challenges posed by international shifts. The focus, he said, includes the price-lowering impact of China’s expansion but excludes the impact of higher oil prices. “They’ve included the part that makes things look better and thrown out the part that makes things look worse,” he said.

Officially, the Federal Reserve does not set explicit targets for inflation. But Mr. Bernanke, a longtime champion of inflation targets, has said that his own definition of price stability is to keep core inflation between 1 percent and 2 percent a year.

The Fed’s job is not made any easier by the upcoming midterm elections, in which Republicans are struggling to keep from losing control of both the House and Senate.

The Fed has two policy meetings, in late September and late October, before the November elections. The central bank often likes to avoid any interest rate changes immediately before an election, for fear that it will be accused of interfering on behalf of one party or another.

Regardless of what Mr. Bernanke does in the next few months, economists at the conference here said that globalization and the United States’ growing foreign debt could make his job more difficult.

Raghuram G. Rajan, the International Monetary Fund’s current head of research, presented new research to explain why many poorer countries are now net lenders to rich countries — and why they might change course. He argued that fast-growing poor countries relied less on foreign capital than many nations, and that they saved much more than they invested.

One example is Chile, the most prosperous country in Latin America. Thanks to soaring copper prices in recent years, Chile has paid off its government debt and is running a budget surplus equal to about 7 percent of its gross domestic product. Chilean leaders are putting the surplus into a long-term stability fund, part of which is invested in foreign securities, that will be used to maintain full government operations if copper prices plummet.

Mr. Rajan said many countries might not have a way to channel their excess savings because their banking systems were too underdeveloped. If so, the savings rates of those countries may decline as people become more accustomed to rising incomes and as banks find ways to rechannel savings into consumer and business loans.

Even though capital is flowing uphill to rich countries like the United States right now, Mr. Rajan said, “it doesn’t mean these flows are optimal, safe or permanent.”

被猎人围堵

被猎人围堵

上个星期大概是最忙的一个星期，星期一晚上在杂志社待到10：30赶最后的稿，星期2，3的晚上，忙着准备两个面试和一个演示，星期4陪丁猫逛街--她买了一双NINEWEST，那天晚上下了大雨她第二天要回家了。星期5晚上连看了两场电影。

公司的HR把Job posting转到Monster.com大概是一个最愚蠢的举动，因为它以为自己还象100年前，甚至10年前一样，每个雇员进了公司就象终身制，和周围的人说起来自己好像就是Blue Blood。它虽然是现在加拿大唯一仅存的历史公司(另外一家BAY公司已经算美国公司了)，有过第一架从加拿大飞往中国的客运机(30年代) ，它虽然过去一直把附近学校的前三名毕业生直接就召进公司。但是在Monster.com上摆了2个星期就发现大事不妙，首先是自己的雇员一进Monster就开始被那些石油公司吸引，其次每个上传过自己简历并同意LIST到档案中的雇员都招来了一堆猎头。

找我的猎头听说我已经在公司换了职位，先是发给我几个他们手上有的职位的信息，又要求我把简历重新UPDATE以后，他们就安排了3个面试。一家石油咨询，一家电讯，一家石油。然后开始面试。我很紧张，因为在这里我只有过两次正式的面试，其实我不想离开现在这家公司，一个是不喜欢试验新的环境(我们老板以前就批评我胆小)，一个是这家公司还有上升的空间。但是既然要试就得认真对待吧。所以两个晚上都坐在家发呆，想他们会问我什么问题。

其实以前我也被私人猎头WENDY挖过。大概2年多前，她刚进安永，发现如果介绍一个职位可以有1500元的介绍费，我们当时说好如果把我卖给EY，我就和她对半分钱，一起度假。面试结果，说只要多伦多或者卡尔加里任何一个地方的审计部，有职位让我进去。后来那个HR经理又打过电话，问我薪水要求，谁知道她犯难说会计师事务所的薪水没有办法和公司比，我要的薪水是他们的SENIOR级的，我当然没有接受。

总之2年前我没有跳槽，这一次也不一定会跳，可是面试的情况很好玩。一个公司问我自己有什么优点，缺点。我一下说了3个优点以后，看他们还看着我一脸专注，我说，“你们要是让我自己继续说下去，我就不会停了，比如说我还觉得自己长得挺好看。”然后他们就哄堂大笑。” 然后又说缺点，我说是交流，不是交流的技术而是语言。从我进公司第一天起，我的老板就告诉我做FA(分析师) 最重要的是要分析并把分析结果讲给别人听。从那个时候我就没怠慢过，生怕自己的语言不够好。走的时候，那个经理说，你一点都不紧张吗？我说紧张啊，手心都是汗，她一握手说，果然。呵呵，其实我当时真想不出自己还有什么优点了，准备的都说完了。

下个星期，估计猎头还会找我。电讯公司据说已经和猎头谈给我薪水的问题了，倒是猎头挖一个人可以拿1-3万，还是私人猎头好，至少卖了我还可以对半分呢。

加菲猫：胖得象头猪，壮得象头牛

加菲猫：美国猫的加肥贵族生活

加菲猫：爱我、喂我，永远不要离开我

“胖得象只猪，壮得象头牛。” 这是十年前看加菲漫画书第一句关于加菲猫的介绍。那个时候和我一起看漫画书的弟弟把我概括为象“加菲猫” 一样的姐姐，而他是象小狗“欧迪”一样的弟弟。他说：你有象加菲猫一样的身材，加菲猫一样的脾气，而我象鸥迪一样受欺负。

十年以后，我坐在北美的电影院里，和那些周末开生日PARTY 的几个一群，十几个一伙的孩子们中间看从漫画改版成的电影加菲猫，听见它说“Love me, feed me, never leave me. ” --爱我，喂我，别离开我。物是人非，不知道它还是不是当年的那只加菲。

看一部和你一起长大的漫画拍成的电影，是一件很危险的事情。年轻的时候，你需要准备一块手帕，而年老的时候你需要准备一些心脏病急救药片。

尤其是，当漫画被电脑制作的活灵活现，加菲猫也撑起了比漫画里还要肥美的猫尾巴，那种可爱是致命的。

加菲王子记

假如加菲猫有一个象中国公民一样的户口簿，那么上面是这样写的，

生日：1978年6月19日
性别：男
国籍：美国
父亲：吉姆．戴维斯
主人：乔恩
出生地： 利昂妈妈的厨房
主要特征： 14根指头，6根胡须和1个粉红色的鼻子
出生时体重： 5磅．6盎司
体重：“刚刚好”——加菲猫自己说的
眼睛：(爱尔兰) 绿色

它最喜欢的食物是意大利千层饼，最喜欢的 “运动” 是─打个盹，最喜欢的狗是─热狗，最喜欢的宠物是─金鱼（因为它们很开胃）。当它从漫画书的走上了电影屏幕，它被搭配上了一对碧绿的猫眼睛，配上桔红色的毛发，它看起来更象是一只“爱尔兰” 猫咪。这对绿色眼睛里的荡漾的满不在乎，和三维动画刻画的毛发丰满的肢体语言，让加菲更加傲慢蛮横了。你不能不说，刚刚过了它28岁了的大肥猫，的确比漫画中的他更加神气活现了。

继第一部电影以加菲猫和欧迪争宠为主线，第二部加菲总算着了一些电影剧情的道儿，它摇身一变成了英国一个城堡的王子。假如你看过美国著名讽刺作家的马克．吐温的小说《王子与贫儿》，虽然不追究版权但是剧情确有雷同。在电影里王子和贫儿的变形成一只英国贵族猫和一只美国平民猫。

故事当然要从加菲猫的恶作剧开始。加菲猫的主人，善良英俊的乔恩深深爱上了在加菲第一集里出现的女兽医莉斯。他烤好了一只肥大的火鸡，在地板上洒满了玫瑰花瓣，并在口袋里藏好了一枚美丽钻石戒指，准备向心上人求婚。可是，自私和肥胖成正比的加菲猫当然不准许有人和它争宠，它把浪漫的音乐换成了节奏激烈的音乐，并一口气吃掉了那一整只火鸡，意图破坏乔恩的浪漫之夜。事不凑巧，莉斯因为要去伦敦开会，并没能和乔恩一起吃晚饭，而深陷爱河的乔恩就买了机票跟随莉斯到英国求婚。

在家里称王称霸，从来没有离开主人的加菲怎么可能让乔恩把它留在动物寄养中心呢？它大吼大叫，偷偷越”狱“，然后和欧迪一起钻进的行李袋，开始了他的英国之旅。可是它到达伦敦的第一天，就被古堡的老佣人当成失踪的猫王子接回了城堡。

城堡里，迎接加菲的不但有维多利亚式的豪华的幔账，巨大的厨房，成群的仆人，和用银盘子捧上来的美餐，还有阴谋。本以为可以继承整个城堡的老贵族Dargis, 因为猫王子继承了整个城堡和财富而心生歹念。他甚至等不及王子活完猫的平均寿命(据说是15年)，已经开始准备把那些城堡里生活着的动物们全部杀掉，并把这片城堡变成一个豪华的旅店。为了篡夺遗产，他把猫王子放进一只野餐的篮子投入了河中。猫王子顺流而下，被乔恩当成了加菲带回了旅店。

于是，贫儿王子的变形已经完成。加菲猫在城堡里吃剩的银托盘堆积成山的时候，猫王子正在乔恩那里吃着加菲最爱吃的意大利千层饼。直到猫王子准备逃回城堡的时候，乔恩才发现加菲变王子的秘密。

当加菲在城堡里和猫王子相遇，它们四目相对，举手投足好像是镜子的里的彼此倒影。它们的性格也在这个时候出现鲜明的对比，一个雍容持重，一个多动多话，他们一起设计惩罚那个毒恶的Dargis，加菲在此时表现勇敢而大将风度，指挥众动物一起行动，简直成了一个英雄。

当然，最后加菲没有有逃出回到迪斯尼的传统模式：正义战胜邪恶，好猫永远胜利的大团圆结局。

加菲变形记

和我看过的所有漫画、动画猫相比，加菲是一只最让人讨厌，却也最有个性的猫。

它的美国猫兄弟“T OM和JERRY ”里的猫咪TOM之所以让人深记不忘，是因为它总是和一只老鼠打打杀杀纠缠不清。而那日本机器猫小叮当，当然是因为它有那只百宝口袋，和先进的时光机器。当然里面也有一些平分秋色的人物：大雄、小静、还有野比。而另外一只日本猫─ HELLO KITTY，大部分人都没有看过漫画书，但是并不妨碍他们的车里的手机座，车座套，还有钥匙链都是她。她就是一只带着粉红色蝴蝶结，大脸小眼睛(很像日本女生) 的，最受亚洲女性喜欢的猫。而我们的中国的黑猫警长呢？他有一群部下叫：白猫警卫，还有一个主要敌人叫“一只耳” ，他太过严肃，我相信大部分女性观众都不喜欢他。

和这些猫相比，加菲是一只最国际化的猫，也是其中最有猫美德的猫，最象猫的猫。它馋、它懒、它爱睡觉、它骄傲自大、同时喜欢和主人撒娇。它也同时沾染了很多人的习气，比如喜欢冷嘲热讽、自私、蛮横、喜欢耍小心眼…并且极为自恋。所以你又不得不说，它是一只最通人性的猫。

它变成的电脑动画猫的时候，有些变形。首先是绿油油的眼睛，让它看起来更象一只真猫，也更加威风；其次是它肥大的身驱，毛发都比平面漫画更加精细，也更加逼真。但是，和他在漫画系列中的伶牙利齿相比，加菲在电影中几乎是沉默寡言了，你很少听见它有什么机言妙语。

如果你在电影第一集中，觉得加菲简直变得比漫画书更加恶毒了的话，那么第二集中，加菲开始变得勤劳勇敢。它带领城堡里的动物制作它最喜欢吃的意大利千层肉饼─狗倒面粉，老鼠打鸡蛋，山羊踩西红柿酱的狂欢场面让你觉得似曾相识。你不能相信这样的总指挥是加菲，它是怎么知道制作食物的方法的呢？那个意大利千层肉饼的卫生标准实在是让人担心！最奇怪的是，平时一贯挑剔蛮横的加菲居然和那么多动物同台吃饭，你不能不说，天，电影加菲变形了。

当然最大的惊奇还是加菲的主人乔恩。那个在漫画里很闷，又非常没有女人缘只好和一只猫发发牢骚的倒霉蛋，一下成了电影里的甜心先生。他有蜘蛛侠一样湛蓝而有些羞涩的眼睛，他有年轻而修长的身体，他说话的时候有艺术家般慢条斯理的气质，他看起来总是那么整洁而又有条理。你几乎可以说他是2006年好莱坞电影中最完美的男人。他看着加菲的时候，湛蓝眼睛中的溺爱简直让所有女人心动。台湾作家席慕蓉当初择夫就是因为“彼子爱猫”，并且说爱猫的男人当然值得一嫁。这其实是一个全球女人共通的见识：一个爱猫都如此小心的男人自然有责任心，会疼爱自己，也会疼爱孩子。更何况是疼爱那么蛮横的一只加菲猫的男人。因此，乔恩简直成为了那些急于结婚的女人心中的新好男人。

我很反对乔恩在电影里成为这样的”甜心“。一部电影怎么可以让人比一只猫好那么多，不但要制造出一个超肥的大众“情”猫，还要制造出超完美的大众情人。

加菲变心记

虽然美国人在新大陆一向以自己的牛仔裤沾沾自喜，但是他们从来就没有忘记念想着欧洲的贵族生活。黛安娜和查尔斯王子的盛大婚礼除了在英国本土，就是在美国有最高的收视录，而美国人从来也没有忘记让欧洲美丽的公主爱上了美国的落魄记者(罗马假日) ，让欧洲的王子娶了一个美国女艺术家而她们生得那个丑笨的美国女孩最后成了一个美丽的王位继承人(公主日记) 。这些，都算是美国人在电影里对贵族的YY。

这一次的美国猫变成英国贵族猫的经历，不仅仅是马克．吐温的《王子和贫儿》的贫富悬殊创造的喜剧，还有狄更斯的《双城记》里的暗线。当加菲猫第二集的开篇翻看一本古旧的图画书，并开始讲there is one point of the time…，你不禁想起了狄更斯《双城记》的开头的话来形容这样的欧洲，和贵族城堡：说它好，是最高级的；说它不好，也是最高级的。

但是，加菲是一只地道的美国猫，除了原产地美国之外，它的随便，傲慢，喜欢吃快餐，都更象一个30岁的美国青年─当然它不关心政治除外。对骄傲的美国人来说，他们不断嘲笑着老欧洲的腐朽，老欧洲的阴谋和古板，却让自己的加菲猫不小心客串了一个贵族猫。英国宫殿的雄伟，黑衣管家的忠诚，银盘子的银光闪烁中，电影无时无刻不在传递着一个信息：说它不好，它也是最高级的。

美国的加菲和英国的王子相比，王子站有站相，面目庄严，英文发音有牛津腔。而加菲喜欢用俚语，站立走路歪歪扭扭的好像可以随时倒下。美国加菲吃意大利肉饼，和汉堡包，而英国王子吃鸭肝血肠(那东西很难吃) 。美国加菲睡在沙发上，而英国王子睡在丝绒的维多利亚的幔帐里。美国加菲只可以欺负欧迪，而在英国的王子面前，猪呀、羊呀，甚至人都得单膝下跪致敬。

相比之下，平民的加菲在贵族的生活里，离28年前美国40多个报纸连载的平面漫画猫的朴素形像和糟糕性格越来越远。虽然它是加菲，但是它是一只3维动画的加菲。它依然“胖得象只猪，壮得象头牛。“它和我们十年前在漫画书本上有点不一样。

它活了这么久，你不能不眼睁睁地看它升级了，看它成为动画了；看见它就象看见结婚十年，身材走样、有点变了心的爱人一样。

兰格格
Jun 28th, 2006

ZHUAN: I only need to know if you're still there

Early the morning, when I read this article from one of my friends.
I could not stop...tearing

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

只要知道你还活着
Duanduan

看过一个故事，有个女孩要离开了，男孩对她说我只要知道你还活着就行。

如果有人对你这样说，我们不用联系，我只要知道你还活着就好了，你一定会觉得这个人不在乎你，在这么年轻的时候，谁不在活着呢？我以前也会这么想，直到奶奶走了，我才真的理解了无论多远的路程都无法比得上阴阳相隔。奶奶在的时候，我不会觉得隔着个太平洋有多远，因为买张机票再远的距离都很近，只要我想见，奶奶总在那里。我习惯了奶奶很老了，但奶奶总在广州的一间房子里，坐在沙发上，拐杖靠在沙发的一侧。这么多年，只要我去看奶奶，奶奶都是这样子。我知道奶奶在那里，我可以见到她，只要，我回去。

现在，我还会如以前一样一年回去一两次，可是我再也见不到奶奶，我这才想起那个故事里的男孩对女孩说的话，才突然理解了这句话。无论你过着怎样的生活，我触摸不到你，可是一定要让我知道你在世界的某个地方呼吸着，当我偶尔停下手中的工作转头望向窗外的时候，我可以想象你的笑容在某个地方开放，我也会会心的笑的。

我的家人我的朋友，祝你们永远健康！

Rwanda：Cup of Hope

Rwanda：Cup of Hope

明天有一个Presentation，我刚刚接手的工作还要重新滤一遍，所以早上对自己说：一定得喝咖啡。

走下楼去，看见咖啡店有这样的推荐，卢旺达：希望之杯。咖啡牌上是一只从咖啡杯里飞起的咖啡色鸽子。我在爱尔兰奶油和希望之杯之间挣扎了一会儿，最后还是决定放弃喜欢的咖啡跟从那个很人文的名字去了。付钱的时候， 卖咖啡的女孩看了我一眼：嗨，你休假去了吗？好久没有看见你了。

我不知道怎么回答，站在哪里发呆。我原来和钟表一样准时，早上9点一杯咖啡，下午2点一杯茶。那是因为我的好朋友NITTE也喝咖啡，每天会凑到一起下楼。要是有特别要说的话，我们就走得远一些去喝星巴客，可是自从她跳槽去另外一家公司，我实在不想一个人站在那里排队等咖啡，所以每天就打着哈欠在厨房里泡燕麦，并安慰自己：喝燕麦比咖啡健康。可是咖啡姑娘一问，我才明白。其实，就是因为朋友离开了，习惯也改变了。

中午下楼去换驾驶执照，不知道怎么就把刚新换的丢了。那个接待的中年男子别了一个黄色的蝴蝶结，蝴蝶结中心有一个点红色的枫叶旗。知道粉红的蝴蝶结代表乳腺癌基金，紫色的蝴蝶结代表糖尿病基金，还有一种白色的蝴蝶结是什么却记不住了，就问他：黄色的蝴蝶结是什么？他说，是给在阿富汗战场上的加拿大士兵的基金会。他又扬了扬手露出西装下黄色的软橡胶手镯并补充：和那些牺牲的士兵的家庭。

卢旺达的希望，阿富汗战场黄色的蝴蝶结，那些很多的伤痛无声无息的潜伏在我们身边，变成一点点微小符号。从咖啡到燕麦，其实即使是人的分分合合，成为一种改变到自己无从查觉。

咖啡杯确实是可以承载希望的。因为我们只要给它一个名字，给自己一种解释，或者一种安慰，然后把戏剧变成小悲哀小希望，慢慢地走远。

日子怎么不是从一杯清晨的咖啡到一杯下午茶，一朵花开一朵含苞那样度过的？把它分解的很小，很细碎，就容易承担了。

夏天就过去了。

今年夏天第11，第12朵茉莉花

中国美女叹西方淑女是怎样炼成的

http://liuxue.ca/Readnews_index.asp?id=65581

这个是不是说我是中国美女？

为什么有人说通货紧缩对美国有利

recessions are good for one thing, and one thing only: curbing inflation.
Match“sacrifice ratio”, reduce the trade deficit.

美国全国房地产发展商联合会发表的今年七月份信心指数下跌7点，跌至32点，是自1991年2月以来的最低点。这会影响什么。文章说美国制造业只有1/4的产品可以出口。而大部分产品不能帮助缓解贸易逆差。
又是房地产在吸收过剩的劳动力，和资金，那么房地产低迷会带来什么？

虽然是老格林斯潘的FAN我也得承认，他在任的时候并没有有效的利用联邦储备局抑止房地产的泡沫，相反，他还利用了一些措施来繁荣市场。这个以后再贴资料。

But until this year, it was housing, a non-traded good par excellence, which has attracted extra labour and capital. In 2005 the share of construction workers in payroll employment was the highest in 50 years, and residential investment accounted for the biggest chunk of GDP since 1951.

2，3年前，各经济学家还叫要小心通货紧缩呢，美国和加拿大跟赛跑一样从去年起的一连续加息，到7月英国，欧盟一起加息，都说明了现在应该担忧的是“通货膨胀”。

这个时候，正如经济学人杂志说的，“通货紧缩是一副泻药”。至少可以把整个市场的需求和劳动力分配从新调整。

Why some people think a recession could be good for America

IN 1871 America added about 6,000 miles of track to its railways, an endeavour that occupied a tenth of its industrial labour force. But by 1875 track-building had fallen by more than two-thirds, and employed less than 3% of America's workers.

According to Brad DeLong, an economic historian at the University of California, Berkeley, the violent ups and downs of the railway industry help to explain the popularity, before the Great Depression and John Maynard Keynes, of a fatalistic view of the business cycle. Recessions, however unpleasant, were cathartic, and therefore necessary. They released capital and labour from profitless activities (such as laying the year's 6,000th mile of track) as an essential prelude to redeploying them elsewhere. “Depressions are not simply evils, which we might attempt to suppress,” wrote Joseph Schumpeter. They represent “something which has to be done”.

In Schumpeter's day, this fatalism was shared by many at America's Federal Reserve. But today's Fed acts quickly to suppress recessions, which it recognises are mostly due to a lack of demand, not an excess of track. For the Fed, recessions are good for one thing, and one thing only: curbing inflation.

Unfortunately, this task is now an urgent one. According to figures released this week, core consumer prices rose by 2.7% in the year to July—too fast for comfort. In theory, curing this inflation could be painless. If the Fed's commitment to price stability is credible, and if people look forward, not backward, when settling their wages and setting their prices, they will respond to the Fed's promises. Unfortunately, in practice, inflation suffers from strong inertia. Hence cutting it typically requires a slowing of the economy as well as a lowering of inflationary expectations.

Like pagans sharpening their knives, economists debate the size of this “sacrifice ratio”: the number of people who must lose their jobs to appease the gods of price stability. Some models, including one of many that guide the Fed's deliberations, put this ratio as high as 4.25, which means that unemployment must rise by one percentage point (or 1.5m people) for 4.25 years to reduce inflation by one percentage point. But other, less bloodthirsty economists suggest the ratio is more like 2 or 2.5.

Ratios like these mean that for the first time in years America's domestic economists, who track their country's inflation and unemployment, are as worried about the future as its international economists, who fixate on the country's external imbalances. The internationalists have long feared that a recession might lie ahead should foreigners abruptly abandon the dollar. The prospect of a more conventional downturn—engineered not by foreign central banks, but by America's own—suggests the cart and horse belong in a different order. A recession might bring about a reversal of the current-account deficit, rather than the other way around. Recessions were, after all, part and parcel of Portugal's current-account reversal, which began in 1982, Britain's from 1989 and Spain's from 1991.

In principle, again, current-account deficits can be closed without a slowdown in production. America's gross domestic purchases of its own and foreign goods are currently running at about 106% of gross domestic product. In other words, there is enough domestic demand to buy all of America's output and more. In principle, these purchases could fall by six percentage points of GDP, eliminating the deficit, without anyone in America needing to fall out of work. America would not suffer a recession. But it would feel like one: every man, woman and child would have to curtail their spending by $2,600 a year.

Without import tariffs, however, it is not possible to curb consumers' purchases of foreign goods without slowing their purchases of everything else too. When domestic demand falls, it tends to decline across the board. In some models, such as the one offered by Maurice Obstfeld, also at Berkeley, and Kenneth Rogoff, of Harvard University, the price of non-tradable goods falls by however much is necessary to clear the market and keep everyone at work, producing an undiminished amount of traded and non-traded goods.

Euthanasia of the realtor
In reality, however, America's deficit is unlikely to close without its industrial structure changing substantially. Only about a quarter of what it now produces can be sold across borders. Andrew Tilton of Goldman Sachs has calculated that to boost exports and narrow its deficit to 2.5% of GDP by 2010, America would need to increase its manufacturing capacity by about 17%. But until this year, it was housing, a non-traded good par excellence, which has attracted extra labour and capital. In 2005 the share of construction workers in payroll employment was the highest in 50 years, and residential investment accounted for the biggest chunk of GDP since 1951. Schumpeter, no doubt, would call this “maladjustment”.

Might a recession do for housing what it did for late-19th-century railways? The last downturn was accompanied by substantial restructuring, according to a widely cited paper by Erica Groshen and Simon Potter of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Workers who lost their jobs in the 2001 recession did not return to the same industry during the recovery. Instead, those who did not leave the labour force altogether slowly migrated to new industries. Companies, the authors wrote, saw the recession “not as an event to be weathered but as an opportunity—or even a mandate—to reorganise production permanently, close less efficient facilities and cull staff”. Schumpeter could not have put it better himself.

Recession is not inevitable. But if a 2007 slowdown curbs inflation, narrows the trade deficit and clears space for an American manufacturing revival it will prove a surprisingly fruitful period of dearth.

咿，我的奖金呢

http://auto.sina.com.cn/news/2005-01-05/163093852.shtml

要赶一篇稿子，才想起翻旧文。我找文章全都上网查。
居然是获奖了？我没有投过稿的？

阿弥陀佛，等人民币升值了，和美元等值了，我再去要钱。

阶级论

阶级的几个象征点： occupation, address, accent and income。
职业，(家庭)住址，口音，和收入

Secretaries, waiters and journalists were significantly more likely to think themselves middle-class than accountants, computer programmers or civil servants.
在英国的调查中，侍者和记者比会计、程序员和公务员更认为身处中产阶级。和主修社会朋友讨论为什么侍者和记者都会比收入稳定而体面的专业工作者认为自己中产阶级？回答说，一般高级侍者都受过良好训练而举止高雅并且在高级场所工作并接触上层人士，就会有身份地位上的错觉。同理，记者也是。

就象我们同事在公司的MONTREAL的CORP HOTEL隔壁住着不是马丁叔叔就是哈珀大哥，于是政见就从自由到保守变来变去。这是社会心理。

从上图可见，英国的阶级分化和美国近年的发展相反，阶级在平均。

But did they buy their own furniture?
Aug 10th 2006
From The Economist print edition

Class is no longer a reliable guide to anything in Britain. But it still matters

WHEN George Orwell wrote in 1941 that England was “the most class-ridden country under the sun”, he was only partly right. Societies have always had their hierarchies, with some group—Boston's Brahmins, France's énarques, the Communist Party of China—perched at the top. In the Indian state of Bihar the Ranveer Sena, an upper-caste private army, even killed to stay there.

By that measure class in Britain hardly seems entrenched. But in another way Orwell was right, and continues to be. As a new YouGov poll for The Economist shows, Britons are surprisingly alert to class—both their own and that of others. And they still think class is sticky. According to the poll, 48% of people aged 30 or over say they expect to end up better off than their parents. But only 28% expect to end up in a different class. More than two-thirds think neither they nor their children will leave the class they were born into.

What does this thing that people cannot escape consist of these days? And what do people look at when decoding which class someone belongs to? The most useful identifying markers, according to the poll, are occupation, address, accent and income, in that order. The fact that income comes fourth is revealing: though some of the habits and attitudes that class used to define are more widely spread than they were, class still indicates something less blunt than mere wealth. Being the sort of person who “buys his own furniture”, a remark that Alan Clark, a former minister and diarist once reported as directed at Michael Heseltine, a self-made Tory colleague, is still worthy of note in circles where most inherit it.

Occupation is the most trusted guide to class, but changes in the labour market have made that harder to read than when Orwell was writing. Manual workers (C2s and Ds in sociology-speak) have shrunk along with farming and heavy industry as a proportion of the workforce, while the number of people in white-collar jobs (ABC1s) has surged (see chart). Despite this striking change, when they are asked to place themselves in a class, Brits in 2006 huddle in much the same categories as they did when they were asked in 1949. There has been a slight fall in the number who reckon they are at either the very top or the very bottom of the pile, consistent with the move to working behind desks and in air-conditioned places. But jobs, which were once a fairly reliable guide to class, have become misleading.

A survey conducted earlier this year by Experian for Liverpool Victoria, a financial-services firm, shows how this convergence on similar types of work has blurred class boundaries. Experian asked people in a number of different jobs to place themselves in the working class or the middle class. Secretaries, waiters and journalists were significantly more likely to think themselves middle-class than accountants, computer programmers or civil servants. Many new white-collar jobs—in vast call centres, for example—offer no more autonomy or better prospects than old blue-collar ones. Yet despite the muddle over what the markers of class are these days, 71% of those polled by YouGov still said they found it very or fairly easy to figure out which class others belong to.

In addition to changes in the labour market, two other things have smudged the borders on the class map. First, since 1945 Britain has received large numbers of immigrants who do not fit easily into existing notions of class and may have their own pyramids to scramble up. The flow of new arrivals has increased since the late 1990s, multiplying this effect.

Second, barriers to fame have been lowered. Britain's fast-growing ranks of celebrities—like David Beckham and his wife Victoria (“Posh”)—form a kind of parallel aristocracy open to talent, or at least to those who are uninhibited enough to meet the increasingly baroque requests of television producers. This too has made definitions more complicated.

Yet class categories remain surprisingly resilient, which seems to fly in the face of recent economic reality. Does it correspond to a new treacliness in social mobility? The best-known findings about the fluidity of British society comes from a study of two cohorts: one made up of people born in 1958, the other of people born in 1970. The earlier group enjoyed a high degree of mobility but the later one was less fortunate, suggesting that movement between income groups is slowing down. Recent international studies indicate that British social strata are a bit more flexible than America's but more rigid than in many European countries.

In fact, it seems that many Brits, given the choice, prefer to identify with the class they were born into rather than that which their jobs or income would suggest. This often entails pretending to be more humble than is actually the case: 22% of ABC1s told YouGov that they consider themselves working class. Likewise, the Experian survey found that one in ten adults who call themselves working class are in the richest quintile of asset-owners, and that over half a million households which earn more than £100,000 ($191,000) a year say they are working class. Dissimulation in the other direction—pretending to be grander than income and occupation suggest—is rarer, though it happens too.

If class no longer describes a clear social, economic or even political status, is it worth paying any attention to? Possibly, yes. It is still in most cases closely correlated with educational attainment and career expectations. And what societies believe about how fluid they are matters almost as much as the reality: if America's poor ever start to believe they will never get rich, the place will be heading for trouble. In Britain the perception that class is fairly fixed could become more damaging if income inequality continues to rise and social mobility to slow.

后面两张是我偷拍的英国地质学家

青山，绿水，小鸭子

服从

不是因为羞涩的是因为纵容
不是因为矜持的是因为担心虚度
留三千里的路途让关山迢迢
隔了三千个日月让落花化蝶

以为你是一个将军而不是一个士兵
给你的每一座城池都高墙深院
给你的每一树桃花都曲径难寻
给你的每一句话都等你先说过再回顾

可是那一城的月色却是锁不住的
象我偶尔抬首的眼神 清白而无辜
就像设计好的江山，怕你不来
有一首诗这样写了 怕风雨交加的夜晚
你假装迷路

可是，爱啊

你要是问我现在还相不相信一见钟情，相信不相信爱情。

我要用多大力气来告诉你，我还相信。不然我我不会在电影院里为一个镜头流很多眼泪，不然我不会在听到那些伤心的故事想把你抱在怀里，不然我不会在深夜听那些老歌，不然我不会在太阳很好的早晨伸一个大大的懒腰想象爱情和工作一样，努力就会升迁修成正果。

尤其是这样做要首先降低自己的智商，抵毁精致的敏感，拦阻自己往悲观的道路上想象。尤其是这样做我要用多少时间陪那些朋友伤心，并且告诉她们不要问感情是为什么。我要用多少时间陪自己难过，告诉自己有一天那个人会知道他错过了什么。也许只是那一刻的落花没有给你看，也许只是那最美的青春你没有在身边，也许只是我说的最认真的那句话你没有听见。

我发了那么多誓要不流泪，学会对自己残忍一点，才知道有一些愿望你是永远无法杀死的，它见到泪水会更翠绿，你根本无法想象它会生存得比长青藤还难以夭折。

最可怕的是它和美的定义混肴了，你希望它清洁，它专一，它阳光，它在伤心的皱褶上有珍珠一样温柔的眼光抚慰着。就如同你希望自己正直，纯真，对那些低俗不懈于顾。最可怕的是它和幸福的定义并联了，你希望它温暖，它普通，它在每个清晨醒来有不涂指甲油健康的粉红指尖。就如果你希望自己勤劳，美丽，对那些陌生人投以善意的微笑。

是怎么样的在心里跌到谷底却不肯在你面前说一句臣服的话呢？又是怎么样怕对你好会失了矜持，对你亲近又怕失去了吸引。在那条长长的路上，岩石都老得掉了牙齿，羊齿草都成了化石，我还在等你慢慢的向终点靠近。

然后聪明的她说，你相信那个人和你当初遇见的还是同一个吗？
终于脸色苍白如雪，不是打不赢爱情，其实爱情打不赢时间和一点点贪心。

我害怕和女生待在一起因为收集的伤心的故事会越来越多，我害怕和男生待在一起因为怕他们爱上我。想和一堆植物待在相亲相爱，开花结果，然后在老了以后告诉你我的工作有多么出色，我的文章写得也越来越好了。只是曾经怎么思念─我学会了打碎在肚子里，老死也不肯说。老死也不肯说，是怕你得意，怕你伤心─那么多的日子就错过了，生命有多脆弱。

然后天亮了，然后雾气都退了，我发现我从来不敢责怪你。
因为假如不爱，我会衰老的比时间更快，仿佛没有在这个世界上停留过。